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The determinant of capital structure is very crucial in decision making as the determinants of capital structure in 
banking system are vary from non-financial firms since banks played different roles from others. Banks are 
required to hold more capital than the minimum capital requirement laid down by the regulators. This is because of 
banks tend to confront with several risks which might be affected the banking operation and severely have 
possibility to insolvent. Nevertheless, there is limited studies investigate the determinants of banks’ capital 
structure as this type of research were mostly conducted for non-financial firms. For banks, which considered as 
highly leverage, should have ability to determine the appropriate amount of capital to engross unpredicted losses 
arising from its daily transactions. Furthermore, the understanding on how bank choose their capital structure and 
the appropriate related theory still under-explored in the literature of banking. Therefore, due to some argument 
related to the theories, this paper is aiming to discuss on the capital structure from banking perspectives and 
explored the specific determinants which can be the ultimate factors to determine banks’ capital structure.  
Keywords – Capital structure, determinants, banks, theories 
Introduction  
The banking sector has played an important role in facilitating economic transformation and economic growth 
through various phases of economic development and implementation. Globally, ten years after the global financial 
crisis which was occurred in year 2007/2008, the banking industry seems to regain its health and have a good 
standing in the market. However, it should be noted that the banking sector is a very risky business and it deals with 
various types of risks. In this sense, until most recently, the issue of risks has been a subject that received much 
attention in the banking literature since the mid of 1980‟s. The banking sector is quite breakable institution in 
which are assembled based on the character or reputation, customers‟ trust and above all perilous leverage. In this 
circumstance, banks might face with failure if something happened badly due to unable to manage the shock waves 
right through the economy (Rajadhyaksha, 2004). 
Since banks are considered as one of the risky business entities, it seems to see that banks have been always 
concerned with two most important issues such as liquidity and solvency (Amidu, 2007). This is due to nature of 
the banks itself where the bank acts as one of the institutions that provides liquidity in terms of capital over the 
demand of depositors through current accounts. In addition, banks need to extend credit through loan disbursement 
and liquidity to borrowers. This shows that the function of the bank is very different from non-financial firms 
where firms usually receive capital from banks to support the financial generation of a company such as buying 
assets or obtaining facilities to improve performance in order to sustain in the market (Kashyap et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, the success of a bank depends on the extent to which the bank can manage the capital structure to 
reduce the risks that are being experienced or in the future more effectively and efficiently. 
As for example, looking to the history of Japan‟s banking crisis in 1991 until 2005, many of the commercial bank 
had confront with financial difficulties and there is also a small commercial bank went into liquidation even though 
the bank was insured by the deposit insurance system provided by the government. The causes of the crisis 
occurred due to the several reasons; 1) the loan disburse by bank were exceed the banks‟ limit specifically in risky 
loan portfolios without enough supervision and weak regulation during the crisis period, 2) decreasing amount of 
banks‟ capital base, and 3) increase in non-performing loans (NPL) due to the economic downturn and devaluation 
in price (Fuji & Kawai, 2010). This shows that the ability of banks to manage the capital structure was inefficient 
added with the weak supervision and regulation by the authorities.  
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In this sense, banks should make effective strategies to address the problem as stated, for instance determining how 
much capital is needed to overcome the risk in their daily operation. Otherwise, profits earned by banks also should 
be considered in assisting and mitigating the risks involved (Amidu, 2007). 
Significantly, the above-mentioned issues have a decisive impact on the overall banks‟ capital structure. It can be 
seen that the excellent management on the capital structure become significant in which the banks not only obtain 
higher profitability but at the same time it can improve the stability and reduce the impact of risks since the capital 
structure might engages with the combination of debt and equity specifically appeared in the banks‟ balance sheet 
(Grais & Kulathunga, 2006; Sakti et al., 2017). Due to this, banks should concern more to formulating their 
implementation on capital structure practices. Furthermore, the capital structure theory itself, namely, MM theory 
explained that the market value of firms is entirely autonomous towards the capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 
1958). This is due to the existence of perfect capital market as well as the non-existence of corporate income tax 
which led to the capital structure remain constant (Sakti et al., 2017). 
The discussion on the capital structure has gained great attention among the scholars, practitioners as well as 
regulators since the seminal work of Modigliani-Miller (1958) which introduced the irrelevant prepositions 
regarding to the firm‟s capital structure. However, the tremendous literature on capital structure which can be found 
in various sources such as books, journal articles, proceeding papers and any other sources has mainly focusing on 
the perspective of non-financial firm‟s despite of banking point of view in terms of identifying its determinants, 
analysing performance, governance etc. It can be found in Titman and Wessels (1988); Rajan and Zingales (1995); 
Bevan and Danbolt (2001); Hall et al. (2004); Hasan and Butt (2009); Frank and Goyal (2009); Khrawish and 
Khraiwesh (2010); San and Heng (2011); Awan et al. (2011); Ahmadpour et al. (2012); Salim and Yadav (2012); 
Ajanthan (2013); Dawar (2014); Chang et al. (2014); Rouf (2015); Guner (2016) and so forth.  
To the best of researcher‟s knowledge, the research on capital structure specifically conducted for banks is, 
however, relatively limited compared to the non-financial firms in which there is few significant understandings on 
how banks practice its capital structure and what is the determinants or factors that might affect the decision on the 
capital structure made. Some studies related to banks‟ capital structure can be found in Kuo and Lee (2003); 
Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007); Kleff and Weber (2008); Amidu (2007); Gropp and Heider (2010); Octavia and 
Brown (2010); Juca et al. (2012); Shahchera (2013); Al-Mutairi and Naser (2015).As such, this study attempts to 
shed light on the importance of banks‟ capital structure by reviewing at the previous literature to address the gaps in 
the capital structure practices.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discuss on the general concept of capital structure practices; Section 3 
provides an overview on the existing capital structure theories; Section 4 present the critical review on theories 
related to banking perspectives; Section 5 carried out the empirical studies on determinants of capital structure and, 
finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and provides suggestions for further exploration.  
General concept of capital structure from banking perspectives 
The term “capital” become a vital and critical resources for all firms either financial or non-financial institutions. It 
can be divided into two main categories, namely; debt and equity. Debt can be classified as a contractual obligation 
where the firms borrow some amount of money from other institutions and need to repay it back within a stipulated 
period including with the amount of interest as agreed during the agreement was performed. Meanwhile, equity 
derived from the selling some of the firms‟ ownership or assets to raise fund for supporting the firms‟ operation and 
investment activities. 
There are many definitions of capital structure derived from the previous literature. For instance, Keown et al. 
(1985) defined capital structure as the combination of the financial resources such as debt and equity which are 
listed in the balance sheets of the companies or institutions. In addition, Haugen and Senbet (1988) had defined 
capital structure as an option given to the firms to choose either internal or external financial instruments. 
Meanwhile, Schlosser (1989) defined capital structure as the proportion of debt to the total of capital of the firms. 
Brealey and Myers (1991) defined capital structure as a mixture of debt, equity or hybrid securities which issued by 
the firms. Furthermore, capital structure also can be referred as the total debt to total asset at book value in which 
can give effect to the profitability and riskiness of the firm (Bos & Fetherston, 1993).  
As there are many definitions given by the previous researchers, Gitman and Zutter (2012) had simplified the 
definition of capital structure where it can be referred as „the mixture of debt and equity maintained by the firm‟. In 
other words, when a company or institution decides to expand its operation or market, it needs some sort of capital 
and this may be in the form of debt or equity. Generally, making ineffective decisions about capital structure can 
cause firms to face financial problems and eventually bankruptcy. The firm's management establishes capital 
structure to maximize the value of firms (Alipour et al., 2015).  
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However, in banks‟ point of view, banks are naturally highly leveraged as compared to the non-financial firms. 
When discussing about banking, it cannot run from carried out the issue of leverage as banks are highly leverage 
institutions compared to the non-financial firms and highly regulated sector in the economy (Ingves, 2014). That is 
why the high leverage possess by banks is closely related to what makes banks special than other industries. This is 
due to the fact that the liabilities of banks are commonly come from the deposits made by depositors in which it can 
be withdraw by depositors anytime they want. This kind of deposit commonly known as demand deposit. In 
contrast, non-financial firms do not engage with any deposit matter as the firms by its nature providing money to be 
deposited into banks. Meanwhile, other types of liabilities held by banks are the asset-backed securities which act 
as the collateral in making a financial transaction such as disbursing loan portfolios. This justification is making 
sense to the above assumption where the banks seems to be more leverage compared to other industries (Berlin, 
2011). 
Meanwhile, the asset side of the banks‟ balance sheet (see Table 1) seems to be riskier as compared to the liabilities 
side. This is because, loans represent as one of the important transactions of a bank‟s assets followed by 
investments portfolio. Even though banks engaging with diversified of loans portfolio which seems to be less risky 
compared to any single loan, the banks must closely surveillance and monitor the loans wisely in order to ensure 
the returns from the loan are sufficient to cover the demand from depositors as well as any other creditors (Berlin, 
2011).  
Table 1: Prototype of Bank‟s Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans and advances to customers 
Cash and cash balance with other banks 
Investment in associates, subsidiaries and joint 
ventures 
Financial assets held for trading 
Cash and cash balances with Central Banks 
Customers‟ deposits 
Due to banks and other financial institutions 
Other liabilities 
Equity and reserves 
Sundry creditors 
 
     Source: Adopted from Greuning and Iqbal (2008) 
However, Berlin (2011) argued that the common laws of corporate finance do not seem applicable to the banks 
where the main caused is due to the deposits hold by banks are insured. In this case, the uninsured sources of fund 
such as equity seems to be quite expensive. This circumstance had made most banks so reluctant to deal with equity 
and much prefer on debt transaction. As the capital structure itself indicate the mixture between debt and equity, 
banks are much rely on debt as form of financing since banks assume debt is more secure and cheaper compared to 
equity (Juks, 2010). It can be illustrated through the transaction of buying a house, where the customer will request 
loan from bank and the customer‟s debt is backed by the house. Therefore, in the event of default by the borrower, 
the house which act as collateral will be taken off to repay back the default made. That is why banks prefer debt as 
they feel that they are being protected.  
Furthermore, the reason of choosing debt rather than equity because of the interest rates on debt are normally lower 
compared to the required returns on equity (Juks, 2010). For example, banks basically take deposits and bonds and 
then will turn them into financing or investment. These transactions involved fixed interest rate as well as 
unrestricted commitment to pay back at a certain stipulated period. However, bankers argue that engaging in equity 
investment will impose them to bear higher cost such as the cost of monitoring in which equity seems to be risky 
and requires higher rate of return (Snyder, 2010). This argument supported by Juks (2010) where the equity holders 
demand for a higher rate of return due to the condition of the investment itself is considered as risky compared to 
debt investment. Moreover, banking industry believed that when they are engaging with expensive equity in which 
will incur higher cost to them, this automatically will give impact to the borrowers as well as the bank might 
transfer the cost to the borrowers. In this circumstance, the banks might worry as it can affected their profitability 
as they believed that increased in equity requirements will affect to the decrease in the return on equity of banks 
(Snyder, 2010).  
Nevertheless, some researcher argues that equity is not expensive and not entirely will burden the banks to incur 
higher costs. Admati et al. (2013) argued that equity is not expensive at all and bank also are not required to have 
high leverage to perform the entire transactions such as lending, accepting deposits and issuing money for 
securities. However, they did not dispute hardly if banks prefer to choose debt financing over equity as banks can 
obtain tax benefits and have implicit assurances by the authorities. In this case, it seems to see that the authorities 
had reprimand equity financing as the debt financing being subsidize. Yet, this circumstance cannot be a reason to 
keep on allowing the banks to proceed perilous high leverage level. Therefore, Admati et al. (2013) suggests that 
the regulators play a vital role in controlling the equity pay-out and issuance as it can help banks to increase equity 
capital efficiently and offer with additional funds which applicable for lending activities. As such, higher equity 
requirement supported with taxes can be a great technique to secure fund (Admati et al., 2013). 
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Despite of concerning on the issue of debt and equity, it should bear in mind that the banks‟ capital structure also 
related to the certain regulatory requirement. Considerably, banks have an identical and unique criterion of being 
able to issue federally insured debt and at the same time, banks also bear the cost of capital which including the 
threat of being placed in dissolution of which is likely to eliminate the shareholders' investment (Harding et al., 
2013).Banks are regulated under the supervision of the Basel Accord (1988) which imposed binding capital 
requirements in 1990 (Berlin, 2011). As derived from Berlin (2011) in his writing, the aims of the Basel Accord 
were to; 1) increase the capital level for most banks; 2) increase the global consistency in capital standard 
regulations; 3) modify the capital requirements in order to enhanced well reflect to the definite credit risk; and 4) 
impose the capital requirements for some off-balance-sheet exposures. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision mentioned that the Basel Accord are voluntary regulatory standards 
on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity risk (Melicher, 2016). Therefore, as a measure to 
overcome the weakness in the financial regulation stemming from the financial crisis occurred in year 2007/2008 
ago, the Basel III was introduced in 2013 where it aims to increase the capacity and efficiency of the banking sector 
to overcome the impact of the financial stress and economic downturn. Basel III also can improve risk management 
and governance and strengthen the transparency and disclosure of banks in making daily transactions (Berlin, 
2011). In this sense, the banks need to comply with the capital adequacy and requirement stated by the Basel 
Committee to strengthen their capital structure and can survive even during the economic downturn and financial 
crisis in the current and future onwards. 
An overview of existing capital structure theories  
The capital structure literature has advanced significantly since the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
become a foundation for the later theories that exist in today‟s corporate finance study and for various research 
determinants of capital structure specifically. The preliminary study of capital structure that proposed by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) shows how capital structure or leverage is not relevant in the firms‟ value. In 
addition, they also argue that the optimal capital structure does not exist in a perfect market where they assumed 
that there is no cost and transaction taxes included. These assumptions had resulted that the composition of debt 
and equity do not give any impact to the cost of capital, cash flow and value of the firms (Sanusi, 2002).   
Since Modigliani and Miller (MM) theory seems to be a bit controversial among corporate finance scholars, there 
are subsequent works had been carried out to reduce some constraint of the MM irrelevance theorem in which the 
later theories might involve discussion on taxes, asymmetric information, bankruptcy cost and so forth. Initially, the 
trade-off theory model was originated from the debate over the Modigliani and Miller theorem where this theory 
suggests optimum capital structure is the exchange of debt benefits such as interest tax shields and debt costs like 
financial distress and agency costs (Brigham & Houston, 2004). Myers (1984) stated that there might be a 
controversial issue regarding how valuable the tax shields are, and which cost of financial embarrassment are 
material. These disparities give only variation on a theme where the firm is supposed to substitute debt for equity or 
vice versa, until the value of the firms is maximized (Myers, 1984). This level of debt is the optimum 
level which maximises the value of the firm. After this point, the bankruptcy cost become more than the 
tax shield, and this indicates a decrease in the value of the firm for further debt. This is called as the trade-off 
theory of capital structure (Brealey et al., 2011). 
However, the trade-off theory did not deliberate the issue of information asymmetry. This issue was later 
introduced by pecking order theory which was first proposed by Donaldson in year 1961 and this theory was 
modified by Myers and Majluf in year 1984. This theory states that firms choose to finance investments through 
retained earnings instead of utilizing external funds, despite the size of the company. In this case, the debt will be 
repaid if the accumulated income exceeds the investment requirement. Otherwise, in the case of external funds 
required, external equity will be the last priority required by the firm (Donaldson, 1961). According to the trade-off 
theory, firms balance between the benefits of tax shield of debt and costs of financial distress, when making capital 
structure decision. In this sense, the cost of agency is often included in trade-off consideration (Gambacorta & 
Marqus-Ibanez, 2011).  
Meanwhile, another theory that carried out the concept of asymmetric information is known as signalling theory 
which was introduced by Ross (1977). This theory is developed based on the view that the firm's capital structure 
can signal the firm's information to investors outside the firm. This theory assumed that the owner/manager of the 
firm know the exact state or have full information regarding the firm compared to the outsiders or investors. For 
instance, investors look at the level of outstanding debt owned by the firm is a good thing because of their high 
levels of debt shows that the firm has a very high quality. However, from the point of view of the owner/manager 
of the firm, they prefer equity relative to debt. This is due to the use of excessive debt can cause managers to lose 
their jobs if the firm suffered heavy losses or go insolvency. 
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Another theory that has been well-discussed in firms‟ capital structure is agency theory where this theory indicates 
that financing with risky debt could lead to an agency problem and the optimal capital structure can be achieved 
through minimising the costs incur from the conflicts among the stakeholders of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This theory had identified two types of conflicts such as (1) conflict between shareholders and managers and 
(2) conflict between shareholders and debt-holders. Nevertheless, Grossman and Hart (1982) argued that the 
utilization of debt can reduce the agency cost through increasing the chances of being bankruptcy and providing a 
managerial discipline. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) stated that the problem of agency cost of equity occurs when managers are encouraged to 
invest in risky businesses for shareholders' interests as they are not the sole recipients to get any outcome from the 
firm. In this situation, the lender may incur costs in the event of an investment failure as members of the limited 
liability entity have limited liability for business debt. According to Jensen (1986), debt plays an important role in 
observing or minimizing conflict between shareholders and firm managers. In this sense, the manager's free cash 
flow may decrease due to additional debt issues since the firm is now focusing on the provision of debt. 
 
Later theory regards to the capital structure is market timing theory which was introduced by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002). This theory suggests that the firm issue shares when the stock price is perceived to be high (overvalued) 
and will repurchase their shares when the price is low (undervalued). Baker and Wurgler (2002) provide proof that 
the equity market timing has a tenacious outcome towards firms‟ capital structure. They further define the market 
timing measure such as weighted average of external capital needs over the past several years where in this sense, 
the weight used is known as market to book values of the firm. As a result, they found that the changes of the debt 
are strong and positive relationship with market timing measure. Therefore, they conclude that there is no optimal 
capital structure in market timing theory, nevertheless the capital structure only evolves as the cumulative effect of 
past attempts to time the equity market timing strategies (Luigi & Sorin, 2009; Shahar, et al., 2015). 
Critical review of the existing theories on bank’s capital structure 
Bank is one of the unique industries as compared to the non-financial firms which have a special characteristic and 
roles that need to be taken into consideration when studying their capital structure. Basically, the literature on 
capital structure is usually alienated between banks and non-financial firms. This is because of their uniqueness in 
which their business operations and practices are quite different to the non-financial firms where it relates to some 
imposition of regulation and supervision by the government or the central bank such as the regulation on the 
minimum capital ratio. Furthermore, in its operation, banks much prefer on leverage as compare to the equity level 
as compared to the non-financial firms since leverage is much cheaper than equity.  
There are some arguments in modern corporate finance literature regarding to the capital structure related to banks. 
The arguments are concern on two main sights which vary in their forecast of the cost of equity and the cost of debt 
when the bank is levered (Al-Deehani et al., 1999). Based on the classical approach, it is suggested that when debt 
is increased, the cost of equity or debt will suffer a modest change as well as the financial risk seems to be 
insignificant. As a result, it will reduce the weighted average cost of capital of banks‟ and at the same time will 
increase the bank‟s market value (Al-Deehani et al., 1999).  
In addition, Merton H. Miller, the pioneer of M&M Propositions was asked to discuss about whether that 
propositions can be apply to banks or not in 1995. He acknowledged that the irrelevance of the propositions to 
banking sector tend to be more clearly by looking to different angle of the capital structure equation in which 
focusing more on the equity side rather than liability side. Furthermore, he argued that many previous researches in 
the last 30 years has been precisely withdrawals from the stringent assumptions of the propositions such as the 
issue of taxes and cost of agency (Miller, 1995). He further argues that the view of banks‟ equity capital being 
limited and costly is incoherent, and in the circumstance if the capital market is left to its expedients, the 
propositions cannot be ruled out even in the presence of agency and imperfection information. 
Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) in their writing about the role of capital in financial institutions have empowered 
the capital structure of the financial institution to be determined by the same withdrawal from the perfect world of 
M & M propositions that define the structure of non-financial firm capital. In these circumstances, the market 
imperfections they consider determining the capital structure of the optimum financial institutions such as taxes, 
cost of financial distress, transaction costs, signal behaviour as well as agency problems arising from asymmetric 
information between shareholders and creditors and between owners and managers (Berger et al., 1995). However, 
it should be noted that the banks are quite different from non-financial firms in terms of two important aspects such 
as: (1) the existence of a regulatory safety net that protects the security and goodness of the bank and the possibility 
of lowering the bank's capital, and (2) to increase the bank's capital (Berger et al., 1995; Miller, 1995). Therefore, 
since banks hold higher leverage in nature as compared to the non-financial firms, it seems to see that this is not 
parallel with the implications of M&M Propositions where these propositions expect the capital structure to differ 
arbitrarily across the firms (Berger et al., 1995). 
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This is supported through current literature found in DeAngelo and Stulz (2014) which argued that the MM 
theorem is not suitable to be used for banking research as it can lead to some issues. In this case, MM model did not 
consider the important concept of capital structure specifically related to the banking field. As noted, banks might 
engage with large amount of deposit-related intermediation, liquidity premium on deposits and so forth. Due to this, 
banks are categorized as high leverage institution where the combination of leverage and low asset risk appears as 
the best base expected from banks before introducing taxes, moral hazards, or other deviation factors. Meanwhile, 
it is different to the non-financial firms where these firms basically engaging with producing goods and services as 
well as create value via actual project selections where it is not suitable to support secure debt since its normally 
involved cash flow uncertainty. In contrast, banks engaged with risk management to develop asset structure that 
help to support their daily operation especially liquid claims. Due to this, DeAngelo and Stulz (2014) stressed that 
MM theorem is inappropriate to support the capital structure for banks. 
To overcome the issue, the capital structure theories were established specifically for banks which pioneered by 
Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan in year 2000. They wrote on a theory of bank capital in which they 
build a model for capital structure in which focusing on the cost of reducing liquidity and the credit flow. Basically, 
banks can generate liquidity due to its deposits are delicate and inclined to runs. Furthermore, in the circumstance 
that uncertainty increased, this will make the deposits extremely delicate in which case there is a role for outside 
bank capital (Diamond & Rajan, 2000). Increased in bank capital would result decrease in liquidity in which 
facilitates the banks to sustain in the industry and at the same time, banks can avoid the financial distress. Diamond 
and Rajan (2000) also mentioned that the optimal capital structure for bank will trade off the effects of bank capital 
specifically on the creation of liquidity, the cost of distress faced by banks, and the ease of forcing repayment from 
the debtors.  
In addition, Diamond and Rajan (2000) also take into consideration regarding to the policies of regulatory capital 
requirements and deposit insurance. These two elements were not merely discussed in the non-financial firms since 
these firm is quite differing to banks in which banks are regulated under Basel Accord specifically when involved 
with capital and banks would engage with deposits. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) also agreed that bank‟s roles and 
assets are not similar to the non-financial firms and banks also do not suffer from the cost of asymmetric 
information. Meanwhile, Slovik and Cournede (2011) provide an evidence from the literature that capital structure 
of banks is dominantly determined by the regulatory capital requirement and not related to the standard capital 
structure determinants as what engaged with the non-financial firms. 
In 2011, Allen, Carletti and Marquez had discussed about the excess capital that banks hold and how it is 
anticipated to support the market discipline and stability of the system. They developed a model of capital which is 
parallel to the observation that banks may prefer a level of capital which is above the minimum amount regulated 
(Allen et al., 2011). Their model is based on the idea that when banks operate in a perfectly competitive loan 
market, this circumstance could attract the borrowers to apply the loan and at the same time bank prefer to use 
costly capital instead of increase interest on loans. Later on, Allen et al. (2015) had developed an equilibrium 
general capital structure model which include the bankruptcy costs, deposit and equity market. In their analysis, 
they had provided two key assumptions of their model in which the deposit and equity market are segmented and 
there will be a bankruptcy costs for banks.  
Swai et al. (2016) stated that what makes bank become special compared to the non-financial firm is since banks 
much hold high leverage. Bank liabilities are converted into assets and in some circumstance, the liability also can 
be in the form of collateral such as time deposit. And this are the outcomes of the banking transactions or activities 
(Swai et al., 2016). From the non-financial firm perspectives, it does not engage much with the liability since they 
prefer equity and at the same time, they do not engage with the deposit but become a depositor to the banks. The 
authority had regulated the bank that banks should maintain the capital requirement at variety level of risk and if 
the banks do not comply with the regulation stated, banks will be charged to penalties, and this can lead to 
liquidation. Therefore, in this circumstance, banks need to maintain the capital ratios to look better to the eyes of 
regulators and enhance banking stability to mitigate risks.  
Existing studies of capital structure determinants 
Although there are numerous of publication on capital structure in the form of journal articles, books, conference 
papers and reports has increased tremendously, literature on the capital structure specification for banks is quite 
limited as compared to non-financial firms. This occurred since most researches had omitted financial firms to be 
studied as banks are subjected with certain regulation stipulated by the authorities. In the context of firms, several 
studies have investigated its determinants and the most cited and referred papers regarding to firms‟ capital 
structure are derived from Frank and Goyal (2009). Based on this previous study, the researchers had carried out 
some important factors that can define the capital structure model, namely, profitability, tangibility, asset size and 
growth opportunities.  
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Table 2 summarize the forecast of trade-off theory and pecking order theory to justify the relationship between 
firm‟s leverage and its determinants. These factors have been applied widely among the later researchers in 
determining the firm‟s capital structure.  
Table 2: The testing result of the capital structure theories 














    Source: Adapted from Frank & Goyal (2009) 
Notes: A “+” and “- “sign indicates the direction of relationship between the variable and firm’s leverage 
Meanwhile, in banking point of view, there is quite limited study on the determinants of bank capital structure since 
much studies focusing on firm‟s perspective. For example, Amidu (2007) indicate a negative relationship between 
leverage and profitability in which this study is consistent with previous study by Titman and Wessels (1988) in 
which it confirms with the prediction by pecking order theory. Banks with higher profitability basically can 
increase the level of internal financing rather than external financing. The negative association between leverage 
and profitability is reliable with pecking order theory but unreliable with the trade-off theory. The trade-off theory 
states that many profitable firms should hold more debt than firms with little profit. Firms with little profit expected 
to face very high bankruptcy costs and obtain interest tax shields that are less valuable as compared to the profitable 
firms. However, pecking order theory insists that firms are more likely to choose internal finance than external 
sources of funding. This can help firms reduce the need for debt financing (Frank & Goyal, 2009). The negative 
association between leverage and profitability also can be found in Octavia and Brown (2010); Gropp and Heider 
(2010); Caglayan and Sak (2010); Toumi et al. (2015) and so forth.    
In other determinants of capital structure such as size, there is no definite findings in the previous literature as 
several studies found indicated a positive association between size and leverage (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Frank & 
Goyal, 2009; Gropp & Heider, 2010; Octavia & Brown, 2010). The static trade-off theory forecast the large firms 
tend to have more debt compared to small firms since large firms are seems to be more diversified and have less 
possibility of default risk. Furthermore, the large firms usually have a standing in debt markets and due to this, the 
chances of these firm confronting with cost of agency is lower. Therefore, the static trade-off theory assumed that 
relationship between capital structure and size should be positive. In contrast, pecking order theory argues an 
inverse relationship between these determinants because this theory clarify that the large firms normally established 
for a long time and already being known in the marketplace. Due to this, the large firms might confront with lower 
adverse selection as compared to small firms. Concerning the effect of size on the bank‟s leverage, Gropp and 
Heider (2010) and Octavia and Brown (2010) have clarify the result where larger banks tend to have more leverage 
and this finding support the static trade-off theory.  
Gropp and Heider (2010) also found that tangibility of asset might influence the leverage of banks. The authors 
claimed that increase in tangible assets might be beneficial especially in the case of financial distress in which the 
relationship support the trade-off theory. Furthermore, the existence of tangibility as a part of capital structure 
determinant can give strain to the shareholders to use instead of high-risk assets to low risk assets (Frank & Goyal, 
2005). In this sense, the tangible assets that bank hold such as land, buildings, inventory and current assets can give 
guarantee to the banks for the money that banks already disburse to the debtors and can boost the amount of debt in 
the capital structure (Kamran et al., 2014). However, the pecking order theory indicated a negative relationship 
between leverage and tangibility due to the limited information asymmetry related to tangible assets which makes 
equity seems to have lower cost (Harris & Raviv, 1991). In addition, some previous study revealed that the effects 
of the tangibility towards the banks‟ leverage is not significant as the increase of tangible assets hold by banks 
might providing more collateral to back up in the event of liquidation, thus can increase more leverage 
spontaneously (Toumi et al., 2015). Accordingly, the effect of tangibility towards bank‟s leverage need to be 
discover in depth due to the mixing result and argument among the theories. 
Meanwhile, concerning the effect of growth opportunities on leverage, the trade-off theory and some agency 
theories expects a negative relationship between these variables (Frank & Goyal, 2005). Based on firms‟ 
perspective, growth firms seem to decrease in its value during financial distress. This can be illustrated through the 
issue of underinvestment in which it can give severe impact towards growing firms and lead them to have less debt. 
However, the pecking order theory argues a contradict finding where the growth opportunities and leverage are 
positively related. This due to the assumption where firms that hold much investment have a possibility to accrue 
debt over time.  
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In the context of banking, some studies revealed a positive association between leverage and growth since the 
banks are deficient of internal funds to finance its investment prospects, and due to this, banks need an external 
fund to cover its insufficiency (Al-Mutairi & Naser, 2015). Furthermore, banks that have a better growth have 
better chances to acquire funds without difficulty due to its reputation and high diversification which can imposed 
them to alleged lower level of risk.  
It is worth pointing out that the similarities or differences between financial and non-financial firms are always 
become an interesting topic in the literature of finance especially on capital structure. Much studies have been 
investigated the determinants on capital structure among non-financial firms as these studies became a benchmark 
for the academician to study in the perspective of banking. Therefore, Table 3 provides a summary from selected 
previous studies pertinent to the determinants of capital structure in the scope of banking.  
Table 3: Determinants of capital structure used from selected studies 
Authors Explanatory variables used** Other variables used 
LE LI  S P C R T G D  
Gropp and 
Heider (2010) 
/ / / / / / / / / 
 Market-to-book ratio 
 Deposit insurance 
Octavia and 
Brown (2010) 
/ - / / / - - - / 
 Market-to-book ratio 
Juca et al. (2012) / - / / - / - / / 
 Market value of deposit 
 Market value of non-
deposit 
 Guarantees 
 Compensation program  
Shahchera 
(2013) 
/ / / / - / - - - 
 Regulation 
 Business cycle 
 Deposit/asset ratio 
 Intermediation rate 
Al-Mutairi and 
Naser (2015) 
/ / / / - / / - - 
 Age of bank 
 Asset growth 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
Notes: ** Leverage (LE), Liquidity (LI), Bank Size (S), Profitability (P), Collateral (C), Risk (R), Tangibility (T), 
Growth (G), Dividend (D) 
Conclusion and the way forward 
Selected works on capital structure determinants in banking perspective has been thoroughly reviewed and 
discussed in this study. Via appropriate review, the selected works was further categorized into two parts of 
discussions, namely, theoretical and empirical. The theoretical works on capital structure have been categorized 
into three main groups: 
1. general concept of capital structure from banking perspectives 
2. an overview of existing capital structure theories  
3. critical review of the existing theories on bank‟s capital structure 
Meanwhile, the empirical works on capital structure has been discussed on the determinants of capital structure 
from the banking outlooks as the main aims of this paper is to discuss on the determinants used to investigate 
banks‟ capital structure. Currently, there is quite limited empirical research and analytical tools can be found on 
capital structure and the financing decision specifically for banks. In contrast, tremendous research on capital 
structure can be found in the literature either in terms of theoretical or empirical works on non-financial firms as it 
became a benchmark among researchers to reviewed. Unlike non-financial firms, research on capital structure in 
banking is still scarce and not comprehensive since most of the literature has omitted the banking industry to be a 
part of unit of analysis or sample in many researches. This is because bank is one of the regulated bodies and it 
basically being supported by the regulators or government. In addition, banks need to take into consideration 
regarding to the regulatory requirement in making a capital structure decision. That is why many aforementioned 
studies had put aside the banking industry.  
Regarding to the theory of capital structure, most of the theories discussed seems to be not applicable for banking 
field. If applicable, the theories need to be modified or need to look at the different angle. This is because; banks 
are required to maintain a minimum capital ratio stipulated by the regulators and rating agencies. In addition, banks 
also engaged with deposits which make it different to the non-financial firms.  
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Due to this, banks have propensity or possibility to exchange capital with debt to increase its profitability in terms 
of return on capital as well as uplift investors‟ satisfaction. However, this condition is against to the MM irrelevant 
theorem. The argument that banks can enhance its profitability through exchange capital with debt is not the 
outcome of neglecting the effect of risk on leverage.  
Therefore, from the above discussion, there are some suggestions carried out by the authors. Since there is quite 
limited empirical research on capital structure in banking fields either conventional or Islamic banks, this can give 
opportunities for future research to conduct more studies on capital structure that involve both banking systems. As 
the operation of Islamic banks quite different to the conventional banks, it will become more interesting to compare 
these two banking systems in terms of decision making towards their capital structure. Furthermore, the previous 
studies showed that there are no decisive conclusions made in order to determine the specific determinants of 
banks‟ capital structure as some studies argued that the determinants are just similar to the non-financial firms. 
Finally, the paper proposes that both regulators and banking players should concern on the determinants of capital 
structure to ensure the soundness, stability, performance and competitiveness in order to survive in the market.  
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